On February 26, 2025, in the lawsuit Agency for Persons with Disabilities v. Toal, the First District Court of Appeal held that noneconomic damages are not a form of relief that can be recovered under Florida’s Public-sector Whistleblower Act.

Noneconomic damages include losses that do not have a direct monetary value, such as psychological pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and emotional distress. These damages can vary greatly, are subjective, harder to quantify, and determined by the jury.

In Toal, Sally Toal claimed that she was fired from her job in retaliation for blowing the whistle. As part of her relief, she claimed entitlement to compensation for noneconomic damages, including emotional pain and suffering. The public employer, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, moved to dismiss the former employee’s claim for noneconomic damages, arguing they were barred by sovereign immunity.

Specifically, the Agency argued that the Public Whistleblower Act (Act) does not contain an express, unequivocal waiver of immunity authorizing the award of noneconomic damages nor are such damages included in the Act’s enumerated categories for relief. The Agency argued that although the Third District Court of Appeal in Iglesias v. City of Hialeah (decided in 2019) held that such damages could be recovered because the Act did not expressly exclude them, the Iglesias opinion did not address sovereign immunity or reconcile its holding with the well-established principle that a waiver of immunity cannot be found by inference or implication.

The First DCA agreed with the Agency and found that someone who blows the whistle in the public sector is not entitled to noneconomic damages because there was no valid waiver of sovereign immunity.

Sovereign immunity can be waived only through statutory language that is clear and unequivocal. Because the Act addresses compensation for objectively verifiable monetary losses (read: economic damages) but does not mention subjective, non-monetary losses (read: noneconomic damages), the First DCA concluded that under the Act, a whistleblower cannot recover noneconomic damages. The First DCA also noted that Iglesias did not mention sovereign immunity and there is no indication in the Iglesias opinion that the sovereign immunity was even raised as a defense. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be inferred or implied, the First DCA found that the Iglesias opinionwas not persuasive authority on the issue.

What does this mean for Employers?

Time will tell whether the other DCAs find the opinion in Iglesias or in Toal more persuasive. Until then, public employers in the First DCA benefit from the Toal decision: the removal of noneconomic damages significantly limits public employers’ possible exposure.